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Decoupled Payments and Agricultural Policy Reform in Korea 
 
Abstract 
 
Abolishing a nearly 50-year-old policy for rice price support, Korea adopted a new 
direct payment program in 2005. Making the transition to decoupled income payments 
has been governed by the need for operative and effective income safety nets and the 
WTO disciplines on domestic support. The program aims to deal with over-supply of 
rice while guarding against the threat of income insecurity. Integrated into a target price 
mechanism, the fixed and variable payments compensate part of farm income loss 
arising from adverse market conditions. Besides, the government launched a public 
stockholding measure to ensure food security. A review of previous studies highlights 
the fixed payment has no or at most minimal effects on production while the variable 
payment carries a fairly large effect on production. The share of direct payments in 
agricultural budget accounts for only 8 percent in 2004 and thus the Korean government 
envisions greater use of decoupled income support. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s almost all developed and developing countries have carried out 
agricultural policy reforms (FAO 2005). Increasing pressure on government policies 
arises from the common observation that agricultural support causes surplus production 
that needs high budgetary costs and sometimes trade distortions. In this sense, a main 
debate on agricultural policy reform at the national and international levels is if 
agricultural support is forged to have a minimal bearing on trade or production. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 recognized the 
reform process as substantial reductions in support and protection (Article 20), and set 
up specific rules on policy instruments. The URAA’s disciplines on domestic support 
depend on to what extent it spawns market and trade distortions. The Amber Box refers 
to most trade distorting subsidies that countries have to reduce their supplies. Output 
payments linked to production-limiting programs are classified as the Blue Box. The 
Blue Box payments are without limit. Finally, the Green Box includes fixed direct 
payments having no or at most minimal effects on trade and production. The Green Box 
payments can be increased without limit. 
The reform process embodying a shift from more distorting to less distorting support 
or transition from the Amber Box to the Green Box equals to decoupling. Decoupling is 
to break the link between policy measures and trade or production. OECD (2005a) 
defines a decoupled measure as such would neither have any current condition 
associated with production or production factors nor create any expectation that a 
farmer’s production decision today could influence on tomorrow’s payments. OECD 
(2005b) clarifies its definition of a decoupled measure as ex post empirical in contrast to 
the URAA’s legal definition. 
The URAA has contributed to policy reforms in many countries. For example, 
flooding out large farm outlays and resulting imbalance in certain commodity markets, 
the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms were agreed to rein 
in over-production and prepare trade liberalization. The 1992 CAP reform introduced 
compensatory direct payments against decreases in intervention prices, a first stepping-
stone on the path to decoupled support from particular crops. The following reforms 
through Agenda 2000 and 2003 Mid-Term Review expanded and perpetuated the 
decoupling process. A highlight of the 2003 reform was to invent the Single Farm 
Payments (SFPs) delinking support from crops and prices while linking it to wanted 
standards for environment, food safety and animal welfare. 
As for the United States, the 1996 Farm Bill (FB) made a bold change into a market-
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oriented support mechanism where farmers could freely decide on what to produce 
based on market signals. Since the government assigned predetermined direct payments 
over the implementation period, Agricultural Marketing Transition Act (AMTA) 
payments were considered as fully decoupled. However, the 2002 FB reversed from 
decoupling by adding Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) that were tied to price. The 
decoupled AMTA payments were embedded in ‘Direct Payments’ under the 2002 FB. 
Following the suit set up by the European Union and the United States in one sense 
and taking into account of the development in the WTO rules Korea has increasingly 
adopted direct payment mechanisms and the process of decoupling. This article is to 
review such a policy reform in the country highlighting policy transition to decoupled 
income support. Detailed discussion addresses the direct payment scheme for rice and 
its implementation issues. This paper also summarizes the likely impacts of the rice 
scheme by examining previous empirical studies. 
 
 
2. Evolution of Agricultural Policy Reform 
 
Agricultural policy reform in Korea has been largely driven by external forces including 
the disciplines on domestic support by the URAA and rapid growth in farm imports 
spurred by dismantling trade barriers. Korea is one of few countries in the WTO 
membership which is actually and substantially bound by reduction obligations in the 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) and thus have had to adjust its rice support 
system. 
As seen in Figure 1, the URAA obligates the country to reduce Amber Box support 
from 2,183 to 1,490 billion won over the 1995~2004 period. What’s required was a 
gradual cut in support. During the same period, the current total AMS averaged to 92 
percent of the final bound total AMS. 
Figure 2 shows that the AMS use ratio, estimated by current total AMS over final 
bound total AMS ranks is larger than those by major countries. For instance, the 
European Union records 60 percent in average and the United Sates. and Japan are 
averaged at 54 percent and 32 percent, respectively. The fairly high AMS use ratio 
suggests that little or no ‘water’ in the AMS made Korea face real cut in trade distorting 
support from the beginning of the URAA implementation. An early response from the 
government was to slim down rice support to comply with the reduction commitment. 
Because the product specific AMS for rice explained 97 percent of the current total 
AMS, it was unavoidable to reduce the support level. 
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Figure 1. Final Bound Total and Current AMS for Korea 
 
Source: WTO (2007) 
 
Figure 2. Changes in the AMS Use Ratio 
 
Note: Current total AMS figures are estimates for the United States in 2005, and for Japan in 2004~05. 
Source: Drawn from WTO (2007) and WTO (2006) 
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Since introducing the government purchase program in 1961, rice policy has changed 
a long way. But the essence of policy variants remains the same as stabilizing farm 
incomes, ensuring food security and managing supply and demand for the staple crop. 
Ahead of the URAA the long lasting rice policy was reformed in a way to abridge 
government direct intervention in 1993. This reform made up a cub on an increase in 
purchasing prices and widening price gaps across seasons.  
The government had to meet the declining AMS limit in line with the country 
schedule under the URAA. As prices were gradually increasing, the amount of 
purchased rice had to be further reduced. Figure 3 highlights a continual escalation in 
prices coupled with a sliding down in purchase volumes. Over the 1995~2003 period, 
the government proposed three times (years) to raise, three times to freeze, and two 
times to cut the purchase prices. The National Assembly which had a right to approve 
government proposals responded with four times to freeze and six times to raise the 
prices. Because of political pressures and interests, the price rose by 26 percent offset by 
a 48 percent drop in volume in the URAA period. The fact contrasts sharply with the 
cases of Japan and the Republic of China which have continued to bring down or lock 
in the prices since 1990 (MAF 2007). 
Sumner and Lee (2000) pointed out that dominance by rice in Korean agriculture and 
its import quota, not the internal support policy credited to the large AMS. Rice AMS 
can be decomposed by an internal gap and an external gap. The internal gap represents a 
difference between purchase and farm gate prices and the external gap refers to a 
difference between farm gate and fixed external prices. Then Figure 4 shows the 
external gap overwhelms the internal gap. Nonetheless an early reform in rice support 
policy would have contributed to an easy and effective reduction in the AMS.1 
Kim (2003) claimed that government purchasing would not be sustainable because it 
had poor transfer effects on farm income and a diminishing role as a market price setter. 
He specifically asserted the direct income support effect of rice purchasing was only 
less than 9 percent of the government spending or accounted for smaller than 7 percent 
of the AMS during 1995~2002. In addition, the effectiveness of price and income 
support further challenged by a decline in the proportion of purchase quantities in total 
production from 29 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2004. 
 
                                            
1
 From a political perspective, a substantial cut in rice support price in a short term would have not been 
feasible because of the likely strong resistance from farm communities. Interestingly enough, farmers 
wanted to have direct payments in the 1990s while they disliked doing away with the rice purchase 
program. Research on direct payments under the WTO system began by Lee et al. (1995) followed by a 
comprehensive study in Suh et al. (1996). 
7 
 
Figure 3. Changes in Rice Prices and Procured Volume 
 
Source: MAF (2007) 
 
Figure 4. Decomposition for Rice AMS 
 
Note: These figures are not exactly match with the notified AMS because of using uniform prices for 
different types of rice quality. 
Source: Drawn from MAF (2007) 
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The first direct payment program for rice farming was the Direct Payment for Rice 
Paddy Farming (DPRPF) in 2001.2 In addition to support farm income, the DPRPF 
aimed to secure a multifunctional role of paddy fields and promote environment 
protection and safe food production. The reference area was the farmland used for 
paddy farming during 1998~2000. Eligible farmers must maintain the shape and role of 
paddy fields in good agricultural and environmental condition. The payment was subject 
to cross-compliance including a minimum standard for fertilizer use and pesticide 
residue. The payment rate was fixed at 0.53 million won per hectare in the Agricultural 
Promotion Area (APA) and 0.43 million won otherwise.3 A maximum size of the 
payment area per farm was set at 4 hectares. Most paddy fields registered for the 
program and the aids amounted to 481 billion won in 2004. 
To address potential loss of income for rice farmers the government launched the 
Income Deficiency Payment for Rice Farming (IDPRF) in 2002 (MAF 2003). Rice 
farmers kept a wary eye on over-supply, which was attributable to an increase in imports 
under the Minimum Market Access (MMA),4 a dwindling volume of government 
purchase and a downward trend of rice consumption.5 To guard against the threat of 
income insecurity, the IDPRF compensated part of income loss caused by a price 
decline. When a post-harvest farm gate price dropped below the reference price, an 
Olympic average of post-harvest farm gate prices for the previous 5 years, the program 
provides 80 percent of the gap to farmers. Farmers receiving the aid must deposit 0.5 
percent of the reference price. About 16 percent of rice farms joined the program during 
2002~04 but stable post-harvest prices in the period prevented from triggering the payment. 
As specified in the URAA Korea renegotiated special treatment of rice in 2004 and 
agreed to increase MMA import from 4 percent in 2005 to nearly 8 percent of domestic 
consumption (408,700 tons) in 2014. China, the United Sates, Thailand and Australia 
obtained country-specific quota for the MMA. The growing concern for rise in import 
and the need for income safety nets amid AMS constraint and declining consumption 
contributed to an overhaul of rice policy in 2005.  
                                            
2
 The first direct payment program in the country is the Direct Payment for Early Retirement introduced in 1997. To 
facilitate large-scaled farming and provide income safety to retiring farmers, the program aims at 63~69-year-old 
farmers who sell or rent out their paddy fields for at least 5 years. The annual payment rate is about 3 million won per 
hectare up to 8 years in the case of selling farmland. Farmers renting out farmland receive one-time payment of about 
3 million won per hectare. A maximum size of the payment area is 2 hectares. 
In 1999, the Direct Payment for Environment-Friendly Faming started out as the second direct program. The aid 
rate in 2006 for organic paddy farming is 0.39 million won per hectare. About 20,780 hectares of farmland are 
registered in 2005. A pilot program for environment-friendly livestock farming is also introduced in 2004 aiming for 
reduction in livestock wastes and stock density rates. Up to 1,000 livestock farms are eligible to the program. 
3
 The APA is zone-based farmland which has been improved by consolidation and rearrangement. 
4
 In line with Annex V of the URAA Korea received special treatment of rice, non-tariffication along with MMA 
import up to 4 percent of domestic consumption for 10 years. 
5
 Rice consumption per capita reduced from 107 kilograms in 1995 to 79 kilograms in 2006 (MAF 2007). 
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3. Making the Transition to Decoupled Income Payment 
 
The key principles of rice policy reform in 2005 were targeting and decoupling. First, 
the reform immediately scrapped the 50-year-old government purchase program. 
Making transition from price support to decoupled income payment was unavoidable 
because of a looming WTO discipline for the AMS and deteriorating domestic market 
situations. Such a policy shift is expected to make room for policy flexibility given the 
fact that the rice purchase program made up almost all the AMS. 
Second, the reform launched the Rice Income Deficiency Payment (RIDP) to provide 
farmers with ‘operative’ and ‘effective’ income safety nets. The RIDP consists of fixed 
payment and variable payment. The fixed payment succeeded the DPRPF as a 
decoupled measure from production whereas the variable payment inherited some 
characteristics of the IDPRF. Thus, the new RIDP is forged as an integrated version of 
previous support measures. Only difference is the new program embodies a target price 
system.  
Third, the reform introduced the public stockholding program for rice to ensure food 
security. It is due to the abolition of the rice purchase program. Under the new scheme 
the government obtains and releases rice at current market prices. A target stock is 
predetermined at 0.87 million tons. The amount is approximately equivalent to a 
national food need for two months or 17~18 percent of domestic consumption as 
recommended by the FAO. The Annex V of the URAA recognizes the public 
stockholding program as a Green Box measure. 
Figure 5 explains how the RIDP is structured and operated. For the 2005~2007 years, 
a target price is 170,000 won per 80 kilograms accounting for the average harvest price 
(158,000 won) during 2001~2003, and estimated income effects from the DPRPF 
(9,000 won) and government purchasing of rice (3,000 won).  
The target price is subject to change every three years accommodating the rate of 
change in average post-harvest prices between the initial period and last three-year 
period.6 It is intended to embody recent changes in the market. But, the National 
Assembly has a right to approve the proposed target price. 
The reference area is the paddy fields cultivated rice, lotus roots, dropwort, or sedges 
in the 1998~2000 period. Given stricter property right restrictions on the APA the 
payment rate for the APA is about 20 percent larger than others. In 2005 the APA 
represented 69 percent of the registered paddy fields under the fixed payment (MAF 
2007). 
                                            
6
 The post-harvest season spans from October 1st to January 31st. 
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Figure 5. Structure of the RIDP in 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the year 2005, the fixed payment rate was 600,000 won per hectare in average or 
9,836 won per 80 kilograms of rice. The size of area reached at about 1 million hectares 
or about 93 percent of the total paddy fields. Cross compliance applies as follows. First, 
farmers must maintain and manage the field soil to the extent that crop production is 
possible. Second, farmers must set up and maintain field boundaries in good condition. 
Third, farmers must maintain and manage water canals and drains attached to the fields. 
Finally, farmers must take weed control so as not to disturb neighboring fields. 
There are extra eligibility criteria for the variable payment. First, farmers must grow 
rice in standing water of the fields. Second, farmers must meet the standard for pesticide 
residues. Third, farmers must comply with the recommended use of chemical fertilizers. 
About 0.94 million hectares joined the variable payment program in 2005. The variable 
payment equals to the 85 percent of the gap between target and farm gate prices after 
the fixed payment.  
 
Variable payment = (TP – post-harvest average price)*85/100 – fixed payment 
 
Figure 6 explains how the RIDP functioned to ensure farm income in 2005. An 
average farmer received 140,028 won per 80 kilograms of rice from the market and 
25,546 won as the fixed and variable payment totaling 165,574 won. Thanks to the 
program farmers bore only a 3 percent decline in final prices against a 13 percent drop 
in post-harvest prices during 2004~2005. The RIDP turned out to be effective to 
attenuate farm income loss against adverse market conditions. 
 
 
Market price 
Target price 
Fixed payment 
(9,836 won/80kg) 
Market returns 
170,083 won/80kg 
Fixed: 1.0 mill ha Variable: 0.94 mill ha 
Variable payment 
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Figure 6. Composition of Farm Income during 2004~2005 
 
 
Note: The fixed payment in 2004 refers to the the Direct Payment for Rice Paddy Farming 
 
The RIDP is nothing new as other countries maintain comparable mechanisms to 
protect farm income loss. Figure 7 highlights income support systems for the European 
Union, Japan, Korea and the United States, simplified for comparison. First, Korea and 
the United State have much in common with a target price system. But, rice is the only 
program crop in Korea. Japan puts forward reference production costs as support goals 
for barley, soybean, sugar beet and potatoes. 7  The target prices and reference 
production costs are all fixed in advance. The United States raised the target prices for 
the 2004~2007 period for most program commodities. It is not clear if Korea will forge 
into a cut in the target price in 2007. It is too early to say about Japan’s program since it 
has just launched in 2007. The European Union has designated the target prices for 
grains as suitable price levels but they are not part of the CAP mechanism (USDA 1999). 
Second, an integral part of the income support system is the direct payment in all four 
countries. While Korea and the United States address farm income through commodity-
specific payments, the European Union’s Single Payment Scheme (SPS) deals with 
whole farm income. Japan’s CSCMSP based upon a gap between production conditions 
is more or less similar to the whole farm approach. 
The variable payment is also a common feature. The CCPs in the United States 
incorporate the difference between the target price and the effective price which is the 
sum of direct payments and the higher of the average market price or the loan rate. 
Similarly, Korea’s variable payment deals with the gap between the target price and the 
sum of the market price and fixed payment. The European Union maintains some 
                                            
7
 This new support system is called as the Cross-Sectional Commodity Management Stabilization 
Program (CSCMSP). 
Won per 80kg 
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product-specific direct aids coupled with production. 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of Farm Income Support Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Support mechanisms are simplified for comparison. Also, note that program commodities are not 
identical. 
 
Finally, the European Union and the United States maintain price support measures as 
the intervention price and the loan rate, respectively. As a safety net, they provide floor 
prices for certain commodities. Since the 1992 CAP reform, intervention prices have 
been cut and have been partly replaced by the direct payment. The 2002 Farm Bill in the 
United States authorized to reduce the loan rates for many program commodities over 
the 2004~2007 period. 
 
 
4. Decoupling Tests  
 
As is often the case in other countries, the lack of accurate data has deterred 
estimations of the impacts from decoupled income support in Korea. The Farm 
Household Economy Survey Report (FHESR) which provides yearly statistical 
information on 3,200 sample farm households has a single data entry for public subsidy 
encompassing all the government support. In addition, a rather short history of the 
decoupled payment impedes the progress of an in-depth analysis on the issue. 
Using the FHESR data Kim et al. (2004) estimated the effects of the DPRPF on 
production. The public subsidy data included not only direct payments but also other 
subsidies including support for needy households, education and transportation for the 
elderly. But the research presumed the DPRPF would be of prominence in the data. The 
Korea US EU Japan 
Market 
price 
Fixed Pmt 
Var. Pmt 
Target Price Target Price Production C 
MLGs 
Direct Pmt 
CCP 
SPS 
Other DP 
Interventi
on price 
Market 
price 
Direct Pmt 
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samples were 715 rice farming households who earned at least 60 percent of agricultural 
income from rice production. The area for rice farming in 2002 regressed against one- 
and two-period lags of the area and the public subsidy. The regression resulted in the 
elasticity of public subsidy as 0.03. 
Two reasons may explain such a low elasticity. First, it has something to do with 
comprehensive nature of the public subsidy data. Since the data embraces even non-
agricultural subsidies its overall effect on production could turn out to be at most weak. 
Second, it might reflect fixity of paddy fields as a fixed asset and unique physical 
characteristics. Despite the data limitations, the empirical estimate implies the fixed 
payment is fairly decoupled from production. 
Sakong (2007) concludes the fixed payment of the RIDP has no effect on production. 
But when the variable payment is taken into account, the RIDP turns out to carry a 
relatively high level of production effects. The paper estimates total rice paddy fields 
based on 100 segregated farm household groups by production costs where a farm 
household decides farming areas by maximizing the expected utility.  
Figure 8 shows how rice paddy areas would be changed by support levels and 
expected market prices of rice. Simulated results indicate the more market prices drop 
the greater the production effect is. As the fixed payment increases from 0.6 to 1.0 
million won per hectare, the production effect becomes smaller than before. It is 
because the variable payment is reduced accordingly. 
Adopting a similar utility function with uncertainties, Lee (2006) provides an 
analytical outcome the present form of the RIDP has a rather high production effect. He 
claims the degrees of decoupling (0≤DD≤1) are respectively 0.303 and 0.367 against 
the expected market prices of 136,000 and 153,000 won per 80 kilograms. The 
estimates for production effects are slightly larger than those of Sakong (2007). 
Some implications from previous studies can be summarized as follows. First, the 
fixed payment in the RIDP has no or at most a minimal effect on production. But it 
needs more robust analyses with accurate farm level data on direct payments and 
management decision. Second, an increase in the fixed payment does not necessarily 
raise expected income or bring about larger production effects because it replaces part 
of the variable payment. Finally, little coupling effects of the fixed payment could be 
qualified as a Green Box measure while the variable payment falls into the AMS. 
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Figure 8. Simulated Rice Paddy Areas with the RIDP 
 
 
Note: FDP 0.6 and FDP 1.0 refer to fixed direct payments of 0.6 and 1.0 million won per hectare, 
respectively. 
Source: Sakong (2007) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Ensuring continuity of the RIDP depends on changes in market conditions and 
upcoming WTO rules on domestic support. As by law enacted, a new target price for the 
2008~2010 will be based on 2004~2006 average prices. But it is uncertain if the 
National Assembly will approve a 5.2 percent drop for the target price, 161,265 won per 
80 kilograms of rice. Farmers and farm community are asking to keep the target price as 
it is. 
Figure 9 shows the simulated target price when the AMS is assumed to be cut by 40 
percent and 25 percent over the 10-year period. Given the baseline of post-harvest 
market prices and the same fixed payment, the target price must be below 140,000 won 
in 2017. The decrease in the target price reflects the variable payment is likely to be 
subject to the AMS ceilings.  
To avoid a weakening income safety net, the government may opt to reinforce the 
fixed payment. Besides, replacing part of the variable payment with the fixed payment 
may contribute to structural adjustment and a reform process by motivating competition 
and farmland mobilization. The share of direct payments in agricultural budget accounts 
Area (mill. ha) 
Market price 
(Won per 80kg) 
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for only 8 percent in 2004, which is far lower than those in Japan, the European Union 
and the United States (Kim et al. 2006). But the Korean government envisions greater 
use of decoupled income support. It also mulls over alternative farm income support 
systems such as a whole farm income based approach and farm saving accounts. 
 
Figure 9. AMS Reduction and Target Price 
 
 
Note: MP_Basline refers to the baseline for post-harvest market prices and TP_AMS40% and 
TP_AMS25% indicate target price levels matching with 40 percent and 25 percent cuts in the AMS, 
respectively. 
Source: Lim et al. (2007) 
 
Won per 80kg 
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